Introduction
The honeybee bounces against the pane of glass, the moth circles the lightbulb, and the dog chases itstail. Honeybees, moths, and dogs are each capable of a complex and interesting set,of behaviors. But sometimes we notice animals failing to accomplish their goals and being unable to adapt their behavior successfully in light of their failures. At moments like these it is natural to think less of the family dog, the honeybee, or the moth. This is not one of our dog's more impressive moments, and while the dog is not a stupid creature, chasing its tail certainly appears to be a stupid behavior.
When a behavior is obviously automatic, repetitive, or arbitrary, we tend to downgrade the level of agency we ascribe to the animal or system in question. By contrast, when a system adapts to changing environmental conditions, contributes to the pursuit of some identifiable goal, can be combined in flexible ways with other behaviors, and has a variety of other systematic features, weare inclined to judge that the behavior is the result of some underlying intelligence or agency.
This chapter suggests that our intuitive judgmentsabout the underlying intelligence or agency of nonlinguistic cognitive agents are prompted by a set of systematic features that mark what we will call intelligent behavior. Thesesystematicfeatures of intelligent behaviorsdo not necessarily license the claim that there is any single coordinating or governing intelligence in the agent. However, we will argue that intelligent behavior is indicative of meaningful engagementwith the environment. Thismeaningful engage ment is phylogenetically and ontogenetically prior to the kinds of intel lectual and cognitive capacities that we expect from adult humans.
In the pages that follow, we will explain what it means to locate syste maticity in the behavior of infralinguistic and minimally cognitive agents.
